Volume 2, Issue 11 — November 2025
Overview
In November, as many as 156 terrorism-related incidents, including five suicide bombings, were recorded in Pakistan, accounting for 373 casualties. As compared to October, both attacks and the fatalities showed a decline of 20 and 94, respectively. The decline in terrorist attacks is mostly related to a momentary dip in Baloch separatists’ violent campaign in Balochistan due to the imposition of curfew, suspension of the internet services, a ban on public travel at nighttime, and intelligence-based operations. Pakistani retaliation against Pakistan-focused terrorist networks in Afghanistan, forcing Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to stop officially claiming attacks, could also be a reason for a decline in attacks.
The major vector of instability impacting Pakistan’s internal security landscape in November was Taliban-Pakistan tensions over TTP’s hideouts in Afghanistan and cross-border attacks. Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul following the Taliban’s inaction against TTP and the deadlock in talks despite reaching a ceasefire in Doha. If Taliban-Pakistan tensions persist, it will result in wider regional chaos and tensions, which will create openings for terrorist groups like TTP and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) to exploit.
Trends
Suicide Attacks
On November 11, a suicide bomber blew himself up outside the Islamabad Judicial Complex, killing 12 people and injuring 27 others. It was the first suicide attack in Islamabad after a gap of almost three years. In December 2022, one police personnel lost his life when a suicide bomber driving a car detonated his explosives after police asked him to stop at a check post. The rebel TTP faction, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), disowned the Judicial Complex attack after initially claiming responsibility. However, JuA’s past track record indicates that it has a functional network in Islamabad and Punjab. JuA not only has a close working relationship with Punjab-based militant networks like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Ghazi Force, but it has also carried out high-profile attacks in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Lahore in the past. The attack is being viewed as a warning from the Taliban regime to Pakistan that if it carries out strikes in Kabul, then their reverberations will be felt as far afield as Islamabad.
Pakistan blamed an Afghanistan-based Pakistani terrorist network for the attack after arresting four members of an Afghan cell who it claimed facilitated the attack. The investigation revealed that they were being guided from Afghanistan.
Wana Cadet College Attack
On November 11, five TTP terrorists stormed the Wana Cadet College in South Waziristan in a bid to take the cadets hostage. One suicide bomber and five other terrorists were involved in the attack. The terrorists tried to breach the college’s perimeter security by detonating an explosive-laden vehicle at the main gate. While the security forces deployed at the college managed to kill two terrorists immediately, three others managed to enter the building before being cornered in the administrative block where they were eventually killed. Dozens of houses and nearby buildings were damaged by the massive impact of the suicide bombing. In total, 16 civilians were wounded in the attack.
Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, terrorist networks in Pakistan have largely restricted their attacks to hard targets, i.e., security forces, and mostly spared civilian targets. However, the attacks on November 11 targeting the Islamabad Judicial Complex and the Wana Cadet College targeted civilian targets. The spate of attacks on civilian targets is a signal to the Pakistani security establishment that the terrorist networks could switch from discriminate to indiscriminate attacks if Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions persist.
Frontier Constabulary Headquarter Attack in Peshawar
On November 24, two suicide bombers attacked the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary’s (FC) headquarters in Peshawar, killing three security personnel and injuring 12 others. One of the bombers detonated himself at the main gate, while two other attackers, including the second suicide bomber, tried to enter and were gunned down in the parking area. The attack constitutes a major security failure because the FC headquarters are located in Peshawar’s high secure zone and the attackers breached multiple layers of security to reach the site. A little known militant group, the Khalid Khurasani Network, seemingly a faction of JuA, claimed responsibility for the attack. The FC is responsible for handling situations beyond the capabilities of police, including tribal incursions and criminal gang violence.
BLF’s Suicide Attack on the Frontier Corps Headquarters in Panjgur
On November 30, a female suicide bomber targeted the entrance of the FC’s headquarter in Panjgur district with a Vehicle Brone Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). Following that, six armed militants tried to enter the main building but were repulsed by the security forces. At least six FC personnel lost their lives while trying to repulse the attack.
The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility for the attack and maintained that a female suicide bomber, Zareena Rafiq, also known as Turang Mahoo, carried out the attack. BLF claimed that its sub-unit, Sado Operational Battalion, tasked with high-profile attacks carried out the operation. Following deployment of female suicide bombers by two rivals BLA factions (Jeeyand and Azaad), BLF is the third Baloch insurgent group to use Baloch women in combat roles.
This disturbing trend points to two evolving trends in the Baloch insurgency.
First, suicide terrorism is no more a contentious debate within Baloch insurgent circles, unlike in 2018 when Aslam Baloch of the BLA-Jeeyand Faction faced stiff resistance from other separatist groups for embracing suicide terrorism. The other groups feared that they would lose the goodwill of liberal voices for resorting to such extreme tactics, especially in the West, which supported their insurgent struggle. For instance, BLA-Azaad distanced itself from the 2018 Dalbandin suicide bombing by Aslam’s son Rehan, in which a bus of Chinese engineers was targeted. Now, the situation has changed and not only has BLA-Azaad carried out a suicide bombing using a female suicide bomber, Mahikhan Baloch, in March, but BLF has joined the fray as well.
Second, it points to the evolving role of women in Baloch insurgent movement. Baloch women’s roles in the ethno-separatist insurgency are no longer restricted to secondary responsibilities as propagandists, fundraisers, recruiters, matchmakers, caregivers and nurturers of future generations. Instead, they are participating, albeit in low numbers, in combat operations. The participation of women in insurgency not only shames men to join the separatist struggle in large numbers, but it also encourages women and lowers the entry barriers to their participation. In turn, the separatist propaganda depicts the insurgent’s movement as modern, democratic, egalitarian and gender-inclusive while trying to win sympathies of the Baloch masses. It also promotes the victimhood narrative against the Pakistan state’s oppression, which has forced women to pick up arms as well.
TTP’s Video Propaganda Amid Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions
Against the backdrop of Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions over TTP, the terror group released multiple videos featuring its self-styled governors, commanders and fighters from various areas in Pakistan. It bears mention that TTP’s chief Nur Wali Mehsud also appeared in a video in October following Pakistan’s claim of killing him in a drone attack in Kabul. He not only refuted Pakistani claims of eliminating him but also maintained that the video was shot in Khyber district. Likewise, the footage released by TTP on different social media accounts aims to falsify Pakistani claims of its bases in Afghanistan and exonerate the Taliban regime of hosting, financing, arming and ideologically supporting the terror group.
Nevertheless, multiple pieces of footage of TTP militants trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan belie the terror group’s propaganda. Besides, the killings of several TTP leaders, including Omar Khalid Khorasani, Shahid Umar, Abdul Rashid, in Afghanistan provide irrefutable evidence of its Afghan hideouts. Not only is the TTP using Afghan soil and the Taliban’s patronage for attacks in Pakistan, but several Afghan nationals have also joined the terror group’s ranks and have participated in cross-border violence.
The Taliban share close ideological, ethnic, political, and battlefield camaraderie with TTP. The latter supported the former during the US invasion of Afghanistan and played a key role in their victory. For the Taliban, disowning TTP, let alone take a kinetic action against it, is impossible. It poses an existential dilemma to the clerical regime. First, it lacks the capacity to rein in such a big group (7,000-8,000). Second, if it launches a crackdown despite capacity issues, the more radical TTP elements would migrate to ISKP, the Taliban’s arch-nemesis. Third, any unilateral move against TTP by the Taliban’s top leadership will put stress on the movement’s internal coherence. Factions within the Taliban are divided over the strategy to deal with TTP. The more pragmatic figures and groups advocate disarming, relocating and demobilising TTP. On the contrary, the more radical and pro-TTP factions oppose any such move.
TTP will continue to remain a vector of instability between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2026 as well. Their ability, or its lack, to reach a workable solution concerning TTP’s challenge will define the future trajectory of their ties.
The Emergence of New Militant Groups
Amid Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions, the emergence of new militant factions, alleged front groups of established militant networks, continued, concurrent to TTP’s decision to stop claiming attacks through its official media arm, Umar Media. The front groups provide plausible deniability to groups like TTP and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group to deflect Pakistani pressure from the Taliban regime for allegedly supporting, arming and ideologically bolstering them and to falsify Pakistani claims of operating from Afghanistan. The emergence of alleged new factions in an already overcrowded threat landscape potentially complicates operational understanding among the security forces involved in counterterrorism. Furthermore, it also allows TTP and the HGBG to maintain plausible deniability to navigate Pakistani pressure.
In November, Ansar ul Shariya, apparently a front group of TTP, claimed three attacks in South Waziristan which killed at least six security personnel. Since the start of Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions, at least five new militant factions have emerged, including Tahaffuz Imarat Islami, Lashkar-e-Dafa al-Quds, Ansarul Jihad, and Tahreek Labaik Force (different from Barelvi Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan).
ISKP Remerging from Shadows
On November 20, ISKP militants shot at police personnel in Bajaur’s Inayat Kalay Bazaar, leaving one dead and two others injured. The terror group claimed responsibility through its official news agency, Amaaq. Similarly, on November 29, ISKP killed a Salafi religious scholar, Maulvi Izzatullah Muhammad Aziz, in Peshawar who was an open critic of the terror group and publicly called it Khawarij. While claiming responsibility for Izzatullah’s killing, ISKP shared a 9 October video where he openly challenged the terror group’s ideology. Izzatullah ran a studio and an orphanage centre in Peshawar. He had been a close confidante of Sheikh Jalaluddin, an influential religious scholar within the founding leadership who ran a movement for spreading Salafism. However, after Jalaluddin joined ISKP, they became opponents due to Izzatullah’s opposition to the group.
By and large, 2025 has been a quiet year for ISKP as the terror group suffered multiple setbacks on operational and propaganda fronts. Not only were several key leaders killed or arrested in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but its key communication nodes were also taken down. As a result, ISKP’s terrorist attacks, propaganda outputs on social media and external plots declined substantially. The collapse of a pact of non-aggression between ISKP and BLA, resulting in the killing of several fighters of the former, also deprived it of hideouts in Balochistan.
Alarmingly, the revival of its activities in Bajaur points to ISKP’s resilience and the ability to come back from difficult positions. In the past, it has weathered operational setbacks by leveraging alliances with like-minded militant groups and adapting to challenging environments. Thrice in the past, ISKP has defied predictions of its demise by the Ashraf Ghani regime, the United States (US) and the Taliban. The ongoing tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban will create multiple openings for ISKP to exploit the chaos to stage a comeback.
Peace Jigras in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
In November, Bar Qmabar Khel and Malak Din Khel tribes held two important jirgas in Khyber’s Tirah Velley amid a deteriorating security situation in the area. In recent months, TTP militants have infiltrated the area in large numbers. As the local tribes resisted a major military operation fearing largescale displacement and destruction of their houses, the security forces asked the Bar Qambar Khel and Malak Din Khel tribes to restore order through non-military means or vacate the area.
While these jirgas were being held, intense fighting/clashes (not an operation) were taking place between TTP and the security forces. The security forces imposed a curfew in the area to minimise civilian casualties and prevent losses to civilian infrastructure. Nevertheless, the locals were trapped in their homes and found themselves in the crosshairs of TTP and security forces’ clashes. On November 6, the jirgas succeeded in convincing TTP to vacate the residential and public areas which they were using to target the security forces and as a result the curfew was listed.
The friction between the local communities and the security forces over the preferable means of countering terrorism has emerged as a complex challenge in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On the one hand, this disagreement points to the growing state-society gap emanating from differences between the military establishment and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s (PTI) government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Their political differences have unfortunately politicised counterterrorism and internal security policies. On the other hand, it shows exhaustion of local communities from endless violence and its devastation on their daily lives. They question the efficacy of major military operations and wonder why similar operations in the past have failed to eliminate militancy.
The local community’s opposition to military operations and preference of negotiations with militant networks have enhanced the latter’s prestige and somewhat established their position as an important stakeholder. Furthermore, the state-society gap has been successfully exploited by militant networks to grow their influence and undermine the local peace. Pakistani authorities across the political-security divide will have to forge a consensus on dealing with terrorism’s challenge without politicising the issue of internal security for better results. The absence of this consensus will strengthen the militant networks.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Peace Jirga
To address rising terrorism incidents and the deteriorating security situation, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government held a peace jirga held in Peshawar on November 12. A 21-point declaration signed by 21 members and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly Speaker Babar Saleem Swati urged the provincial assembly to formulate a Provincial Action Plan for Peace. Among other things, the jirga urged the federal government to prioritise negotiations with the Taliban regime and consult the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government over Afghan policy. The jirga also asked for the reopening of all trade routes with Afghanistan and for reducing tensions between the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and federal governments. The jirga also demanded an in-camera briefing for the legislators on the ongoing counterterrorism operation within a stipulated time.
Once again, the jirga exposes the politics and differences of opinion between Islamabad and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, negatively impacting counterterrorism operations. While the provincial government should avoid politicising security policies, Islamabad should ensure consensus among all the stakeholders instead of unilaterally imposing security policies.
Response
Pakistan-Taliban Talks
In November, diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan collapsed in the third week of November due to entrenched positions shaped by heightened sentiments on both sides. Following two rounds of talks (October 17-18 and October 25-30) resulting in a ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Doha, three more rounds were held in Istanbul to a) cement the ceasefire, and b) reach a written, verifiable mechanism to address TTP’s challenge. The Taliban’s persistent denial of supporting and hosting TTP and Pakistan’s insistence on linking any deal to TTP’s question resulted in a deadlock. No agreement was signed between the two sides, and while agreeing to uphold the ceasefire, Pakistan issued some aggressive and bold statements that the truce’s future will be determined by the Taliban’s ability to stop Afghanistan-based Pakistani terrorist networks from cross-border attacks. Tensions are likely to persist as both sides have not budged from their stated positions, and terrorist networks will exploit the chaos ensuing from border clashes.
Pakistan’s decision to take the Taliban regime head on represents a paradigm shift in official thinking after failing to convince the clerical regime to rein in TTP and other networks through diplomatic channels. Pakistan will continue to impose punitive costs on Kabul for hosting and supporting TTP, irrespective of the consequences. However, Pakistan’s hardline position will strengthen the Taliban-TTP nexus, result in more militant violence and create new fault lines that terrorist networks will exploit. Therefore, both sides need to continue the talks until they reconcile their maximalist positions and reach a workable formula. Nonetheless, the talk-fight pattern is likely to persist as reconciliation eludes the negotiations.
Airstrikes in Afghanistan
On November 25, Pakistan allegedly carried out airstrikes in Khost, Paktika and Kunar provinces in Afghanistan targeting militant camps. These strikes followed the FC headquarters bombing in Peshawar. However, Pakistan has not officially owned the airstrikes and the Pakistan Army’s spokesman has denied culpability. The strategy to disown airstrikes seemingly resembles the Taliban’s position of denying TTP’s presence in Afghanistan by the Taliban. Following these airstrikes, TTP’s propaganda arm, Umar Media, resumed its activities of daily claims and issuing official statements after a one-month hiatus. TTP stopped its official propaganda operations during the Afghanistan-Pakistan negotiations. Pro-TTP and the Taliban-linked social media accounts accused Pakistan of airstrikes and warned of a possible response. The silence from TTP was to undermine the Pakistani position that terror group was carrying out attacks in Pakistan from its hideouts in Afghanistan.
Decapitation of Terrorists in IBOs
On November 6, acting on a tip-off Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police and Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) killed an ISKP militant during an encounter in Karak district. The terrorist, Nisar Hakeem, ran a homeopathic clinic and was involved in the botched assassination attempt on the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUIF) chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman. He was running a hijama centre in Karak. The encounter lasted over four hours and left three police personnel wounded. He was long on the radar of security forces for recruiting and organizing ISKP’s network in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
On November 12, TTP announced that its key commander Qari Hayatullah, wanted in the 2015 Meena Bazar bombing and the 2022 Police Lines attack in Peshawar, succumbed to his injuries in Nangarhar, Afghanistan. In October, TTP’s Deputy Emir Mufti Mazahaim was killed in Bajaur district. However, despite losing key commanders, TTP’s operational strength has not weakened due to a resilient organisational structure and the continuous influx of jihadist factions into its ranks from Pakistan. Over 100 militant factions have joined TTP since July 2020.
On November 23, Pakistani security forces eliminated two key commanders of TTP, Abu Darda and Abu Dajana, respectively, hailing from Punjab’s Muzaffargarh and Taunsa districts in Dera Ismail Khan. While the elimination of key leaders depicts growing operational effectiveness of Pakistan’s Intelligence Based Operations, it also reveals TTP’s ability to make inroads into Punjab, especially in the southern districts. TTP’s chief propagandist and Umar Media’s head, Chaudhry Muneebur Rehman Jutt, is also a Punjabi. TTP has secured oaths of allegiances from factions belonging to the defunct Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Ghazi Force to grow its footprint. As compared to northern Punjab, TTP cells have been more active in southern Punjab, especially in Taunsa Sharif, Mianwali and Dera Ghazi Khan districts.
Outlook
Violence is likely to persist, and Taliban-Pakistan tensions will be the defining feature of Pakistan’s internal security landscape. More obscure militant groups acting as front groups of old militant networks will emerge to provide them with plausible deniability for their acts of violence while deflecting Pakistan’s pressure from the Taliban regime. At the same time, the slowing momentum of the Baloch insurgent is unlikely to be prolonged, as socially resilient movements can undergo a lull period in a protracted struggle. The factors discussed above underline the complexity of Pakistan’s security mosaic, which evolves rapidly and requires a dispassionate analysis to look for long-term solutions. Kinetic actions will only blunt the sharp edge of terrorism, good governance, strengthening state-society relations, consensus-based decision-making and depoliticisation of security policies will be critical to navigate the security challenges.
