February 5, 2026 is approaching, which brings with it the imminent expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This marks not only the expiry of yet another treaty, but also the likely demise of the final and sole pillar of bilateral nuclear restraint between the United States and Russia. Since the early seventies, this will be the first occasion the two most heavily nuclear-equipped nations will be functioning without any legally guaranteed limitations on their strategic arsenals. This expiration can serve as a wake-up call for scholars and policymakers, reminding them that arms control was never just about numbers, but about predictability, transparency, and managing existential risk. The end of ‘New START’ threatens to lead the international system into what may be more appropriately be called the blind nuclear era, in which misjudgements would be used instead of verification, and fear will replace certainty.
The New START has worked as a silent stabilizer of strategic competition since it was implemented in 2011. It provided a common factual basis on nuclear forces between Washington and Moscow through on-site inspections, data exchanges and tens of thousands of notifications. These processes were not merely symbolic; they were operationally decisive. They lowered incentives for an arms race and institutionalized the habit of communication even during intense political hostilities. If such mechanisms are not sustained, numbers could exceed the 1,550 warhead limit established under the treaty. More dangerous still is the loss of mutual visibility. Although satellites and other national technical means can monitor launchers and deployments, they cannot verify warhead loadings, conversion claims, or doctrinal intentions. Without such intrusive verification, strategic planners would be pushed to operate under worst-case assumptions, and as history has often shown, worst-case assumptions breed arms races.
This emerging blindness is unfolding a strategic environment expected to be more dangerous and complex than that of the Cold War era. The mutual trust that underpinned the US-Soviet arms control practices is gradually being undermined by multipolar belligerence. The fast-paced modernization of China’s nuclear capabilities, though still numerically inferior to those of the US and Russia, is reshaping threat perceptions and becoming more entrenched in Washington. Beijing’s stated ambitions to significantly expand its nuclear arsenal by the early 2030s have further contributed to the paralysis of arms control initiatives, as the exclusion of China from current agreements and the lack of enforcement of existing restrictions have not immediately increased instability but have stalled progress. Arms control has proven effective when binding treaties were in force, but the decision to allow New START to expire flips that login and contributes to the normalisation of unchecked nuclear arms competition.
The destabilizing effect of the erosion of this treaty is magnified by the rise of emerging and disruptive technologies that were never envisaged when the original arms control architecture was built. Decision-support systems based on artificial intelligence, cyber operations aimed at command-and-control networks, and increasingly congested space-based infrastructures, are shrinking decision-making timelines, and blurring the line between the conventional and nuclear arena. The lack of institutional dialogue at the level of the Bilateral Consultative Commission is extremely dangerous in such an environment. Even routine military operations could be misinterpreted as the initial stages of nuclear escalation in the absence of forums for clarifying state intentions. Today, the concept of strategic stability is less about first strikes and more about preventing mistakes, miscalculations, and accidental escalations driven by automation.
Advocates of arms control and disarmament must resist the false narrative that restraint is obsolete in an era of great power competition. On the contrary, competition without rules is precisely the condition under which restraint becomes most necessary. Politically binding or even informal agreements, such as maintaining current stockpiles after a treaty’s expiration, may not be optimal, but they would help prevent entanglement in an arms race. These actions should not be regarded as concessions, but as tools of risk management that leave room for bargaining. Simultaneously, future arms control must evolve beyond Cold War concepts. Counting warheads is necessary, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. Standards for the responsible application of AI to nuclear command systems, transparency in hypersonic testing, and the assurance of resilient space-based early warning capabilities must become focal points of future of arms control discussions.
Finally, the expiration of New START should be treated as a strategic warning, not as an administrative footnote. A blind nuclear environment does not make states safer or more powerful; it makes them more anxious, more reactive, and more prone to catastrophic error. Arms control has never been a matter of trust but rather of institutionalized skepticism, designed to transform abrupt competition into controlled competition. Abandoning it in the name of unfettered power maximization reflects strategic weakness, not strength. If the post-New START era becomes merely a pause before resuming the arms race, the international order will have learned nothing from decades of hard-earned experience. However, an alternative path remains available in the form of a renewed commitment to restraint, transparency, and eventual disarmament. These principles must serve not as instruments of prestige, but as safeguards against the existential threat to humanity.
