

# REPORT



**Islamabad  
Policy Institute**  
*Supporting Dialogue for Peace & Development*

## **Change in Afghanistan: Potential Resurgence of TTP**

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# **Change in Afghanistan: Potential Resurgence of TTP**

**Rapporteur**

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**Islamabad Policy Institute Pakistan**

**Introduction**

The astonishing return of the Afghan Taliban to power in Kabul after twenty long years of war, which involved foreign forces led by the US and its Western allies, and later on Afghan National Army, heralds a new chapter in the geopolitics of the region. The war-torn country continues to grapple with a plethora of political, social, and economic challenges, which have lasting implications for regional peace and stability. As militant groups reorganize in Afghanistan, for Pakistan, the potential resurgence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is one of the gravest threats arising due to ascendancy of the Afghan Taliban.

**Prof. Sajjad Bokhari****Executive Director IPI**

- Afghanistan, our western neighbour, has experienced a profound change with the departure of American forces and the ascendancy of the Taliban. Meanwhile, the US-backed Ghani government and American-trained military collapsed within weeks. As a result, the Taliban took over Kabul, without a fight on August 15.
- Six weeks later, the Taliban announced an interim cabinet, while regional countries have enhanced their mutual coordination and also engaged with the Taliban for peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region.
- Meanwhile, with the ascendancy of the Taliban, Pakistan is faced with an elevated threat of a resurgence of TTP. Right-wing extremist groups within Pakistan are seeking inspiration from the Taliban's 'victory' in Afghanistan. Consequently, the character of militancy in the Afghanistan and region will undergo a gradual change.
- After decisive military operations, the Pakistan army degraded the presence of TTP in the tribal region and demolished its operational network. TTP militants crossed over to Afghanistan, taking refuge in eastern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. TTP has been reorganizing itself since December 2019. The release of its top commanders from prisons in Afghanistan, after the takeover of the Taliban, has helped it further. According to a United Nations (UN) report published in February 2021, TTP has regained strength and its fighting cadre ranges between 2500 to 6000 members. Over the past three months, we have witnessed a renewed campaign of violence by the TTP inside Pakistan.
- Besides, TTP has managed to operate in new locations through forming linkages with groups such as Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Meanwhile, TTP has also diversified its targets by attacking Chinese citizens and projects sites, to the detriment of Pakistan.
- Now TTP Chief Noor Wali Mehsud and senior leader Faqir Muhammad have pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban. This might constrain the ability of the Afghan Taliban to take measures against TTP under Pakistani pressure. As these challenges emerge, Pakistani policy-makers are faced with a delicate and difficult situation.

**Dr. Rashid Ahmed**

**Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies,  
National Defence University**

- TTP rose to prominence as one of Pakistan's deadliest militant groups in 2007. The TTP, which has ties to al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and a slew of other militant groups, has left its mark on Pakistan's terrain with some of the country's worst terrorist assaults.
- Some of the most notorious attacks of TTP are as under:
  1. An assault on the Pakistan Navy's largest airbase in 2011;
  2. An attack on Jinnah international airport in 2014;
  3. In Peshawar, Pakistan, in 2014, a massacre at the Army Public School murdered 150 people, almost all of them were students.
- The TTP's decline began after the military's Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which began in 2014, and a US drone campaign, and by 2016, it was almost non-functional in performing assaults.
- The recent increase in the TTP's activity gives an impression that the group desires to consolidate its base and reinvigorate its violent campaign.

**2019–Early 2021: Signs of a Resurgent TPP**

- Despite internal strife and members defecting to the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), the group has continued to wage war against the State. Consider the following:
  1. During the 2018 national elections in Pakistan, the TTP conducted a series of attacks against politicians.
  2. There were increases in 2019 and 2020 in the TTP's attacks in erstwhile FATA and KP (combined), though the overall number has remained low.
  3. TTP's total attacks in FATA and KP increased to twenty-one and twenty-eight in 2019 and 2020, respectively, compared to only twelve attacks in 2018.
  4. The TTP was responsible for over a hundred cross-border strikes from Afghanistan into Pakistan in the last six months of 2020. Although the number of fatalities was minimal, the majority of these attacks targeted Pakistani security forces, particularly the police.
  5. Since the start of 2021, TTP's activity has increased significantly, for example:
    - a. Four female development workers were killed in an attack in North Waziristan in February 2021;

- b. Two police officers killed in Islamabad and Rawalpindi in March 2021 were suspected to be linked to the TTP.
  - c. The TTP claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a hotel in Quetta in April 2021, signalling that the group intends to expand its operations beyond KP.
6. The TTP has also renewed efforts to exploit pre-existing grievances against the State:
  - a. TTP propaganda video released in December 2019 includes interviews with citizens who are protesting the acts, which include extrajudicial killings and forced displacement due to military operations, among other things.
7. In assessing the threat posed by the TTP, it is important not to overlook its splinter groups, such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar, and the TTP's attempts to re-integrate those factions back into the core group.
8. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar was formed in August 2014 under the leadership of Omar Khalid Khorasani and is believed to operate from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
9. Both Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizb-ul-Ahrar have been responsible for highly deadly attacks within Pakistan, surpassing the TTP's level of activity in recent years. For example, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar cooperated with ISKP in at least nine attacks between 2015 and 2018 that killed 219 people and injured 490.
10. Between mid-2018 and mid-2020, Hizbul Ahrar was involved in at least 13 deadly attacks across the country, including two suicide attacks.
11. Umar Media claimed in August 2020 that Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Hizbul Ahrar had formally united the TTP to unify their efforts against Pakistani security officials, with Noor Wali remaining as the group's head. This statement came after TTP made other merger-related announcements in July 2020.
12. The TTP's increasing use of intimidation is another indicator of its rebirth. After years of low-key activity, reports surfaced in August 2019 that TTP militants were threatening inhabitants of Miranshah and North Waziristan, and had warned them not to play music or leave their houses without a male guardian.
13. These developments have reinforced concerns about a potential TTP resurgence, as the group seems intent on rebuilding its operational capacity by consolidating various factions and groups.

#### **REGIONAL ALLIANCES AND RIVALRIES**

- The TTP's ability to achieve its goal of reenergizing itself will very certainly be influenced by its changing relationships with other militant groups in the region. The TTP's links with other terrorist groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda, and ISKP have been essential in supplying the group with material rewards and legitimising its ideology.

**AFGHAN TALIBAN**

- The Afghan Taliban victory is also being celebrated by the TTP. Even it idealized the Doha peace talks as well.
- The TTP's video Abtal-ul-Amat (“Heroes of the Nation”), which commemorated Hakimullah Mehsud and was released in April 2020, underlines the TTP's affiliation with and reverence for the Afghan Taliban. The video shows Hakimullah and Noor Wali, as well as other TTP Taliban leaders, meeting with Mullah Sangeen Zadran, a prominent Haqqani Taliban commander. According to one interpretation of the video, the TTP was anxious to promote both its tight ties with the Afghan Taliban and its support for the group.
- For the TTP, remaining aligned with the Afghan Taliban allows it to capitalize on the widespread support among Pashtun tribesmen for the Afghan jihad, which in turn boosts the TTP's own resources and legitimacy.
- The TTP's future relationship with the Afghan Taliban could take numerous forms. It's possible that the Afghan Taliban would try to use their clout to convince the TTP to stop attacking and negotiate with the Pakistani government, especially if they want to keep a good relationship with Pakistan. However, it would trigger the formation of more extreme TTP splinter groups that would continue to target Pakistan and cooperate with groups such as ISKP. This pattern has been observed in the past, as when groups such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar cooperated with ISKP at an operational level.
- However, if TTP leaders refuse to renounce violence against the Pakistani state, the Afghan Taliban might seek to distance themselves from TTP to preserve their cooperative relationship with Pakistan.
- The Afghan Taliban are avoiding becoming entangled in the TTP-Pakistan conflict, and prefer to stay neutral.
- If so, the TTP will continue to enjoy safe havens within Afghanistan in the future and will try to channelize all of its resources into waging a brutal assault on Pakistan.

**AL-QAEDA**

- Al-Qaeda's relationship with the militants, who later formed the TTP in 2007, is rooted in the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as it paved the way for the gradual development of the group. US operations against the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan resulted in an influx into Pakistan's tribal areas.
- Al-Qaeda played an important role in providing money to local militants to rent space for training camps, recruit local tribesmen, and take other steps that allowed for the later emergence of the TTP.
- In addition to material benefits, the TTP, especially its senior leadership, received ideological support from al-Qaeda, which supported the TTP through various media outlets and, in contrast to the Afghan Taliban, encouraged its jihad against the Pakistani state.

**ISLAMIC STATE KHORASAN PROVINCE (ISKP)**

- TTP appears to be a key ally of ISKP.
- ISKP, which first appeared in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in 2014–15, launched a surge of propaganda and brutality defined by the Islamic State's distinctive takfiri (the labelling of other Muslims as apostates or nonbelievers) and anti-nationalist ideology.
- Initially, there appeared to be a chance of a complete alignment between the TTP and the ISKP: in October 2014, six TTP officials officially pledged their allegiance (bay'a) to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
- However, it was immediately clear that the TTP was split on whether or not to join the Islamic State offshoot, owing to the TTP's previous connections with the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda.
- Even though the TTP's core has not merged with ISKP, there does not appear to have been any direct conflict between the two organisations. This is most likely owing to the TTP's sense of tactical usefulness in ISKP's fight against the Pakistani state, as well as ISKP's history of working with local terrorist organisations.
- Majority of ISKP's emirs had ties to the TTP, including the first emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan, a native of KP's Orakzai District and a former TTP commander.
- At the moment, four essential qualities of the TTP stand out as its most threatening attributes, keeping it at bay:
  1. Its evolving nature.
  2. Its resolve to revive itself.
  3. The potential appeal of its message to aggrieved populations.
  4. Its immersion within the broader militant landscape.
- The Pakistani state must take actions that go well beyond kinetic measures to undercut the TTP's ideology, limit its propaganda and recruitment, and disrupt its coordination with other violent organisations.
- Negotiating with the TTP, on the other hand, would be a bad idea for the Pakistani government. Apart from the fact that the government has no motive to deal with a terrorist organisation that has not posed a significant danger to the state for at least five years, it will also provide this non-state armed group legal recognition.



**Mr. Amir Rana**

**Director, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies**

- TTP cannot gain the same status which it once enjoyed before 2014 for multiple reasons:
  - The TTP's narrative being lost over time due to the efforts of Pakistan's armed forces.
  - TTP is no longer talking about waging global jihad or bringing an Islamic revolution. Its political narrative has changed and it may now focus on establishing an Islamic Emirate in the tribal region of Pakistan, on the similar pattern of their counterparts in Afghanistan.
- Another challenge remains about the TTP's deep connections with the sectarian landscape in Pakistan. The group has strategically remained a very close ally of violent sectarian actors in Pakistan.
- This also needs to be assessed how this new political transformation will help TTP to evolve their deeper relationship with the Taliban regime within Afghanistan.
- The threat of ISKP is also potential. So far the group has confined itself in parts of Afghanistan, so this is not going to be a major threat at this time. But, the nature of terrorist organizations is always fluid and they keep on changing their tactics. The life of every terrorist organization lies in the traction in its narrative, so whenever any organisation gets attraction through a narrative, it gets a new life. In the past, many ideological movements, both Islamic and un-Islamic, have gained significance through a new, appealing narrative and transformed themselves into a formidable threat.
- In the recent context, there is a need to re-evaluate the operational capabilities of these organizations on a periodical basis. We need to find out about the source of their narrative. It could be either from the Taliban victory in Afghanistan or from the cultivation of local support bases, or even from any similar movement in any part of the world.
- The issue is either the state is focusing mainly on the internal security threat which is being posed by the group after August 15, or the state is trying to capitalize more on the gains it secured through the Taliban's victory on the geopolitical landscape.
- It appears that the priority of the state institutions is to capitalize on the advantages it has gained from the Taliban's takeover of Kabul. In this context, the threat of TTP and ISKP may not appear a grave one, and the threat perception of the security institutions in Pakistan remains that they can afford a lesser evil if this is going to give Islamabad a major strategic advantage, especially in the regional context.
- But the Afghan Taliban know that these groups, like IS-K, Al-Qaida, TTP, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), are bargaining tool in their hands. Through these groups, they can engage their respective neighbours and other major powers.
- In the broader context, Pakistan is capitalizing and focusing on the geostrategic landscape of South Asia. Certainly, Pakistan does not want India to be sitting in its backyard, but we need to ask if this is the only advantage Pakistan wants to sustain, or it has any longer-term



interest in the region. The execution of many transnational projects, like Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and Cental Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000), is contingent upon the stability in Afghanistan. If these materialise, Islamabad will get strategic leverage in South Asian politics for being a transit route for energy and trade.

- The biggest challenge which Pakistan is facing is not the TTP but the attitude of the Afghan Taliban. The Taliban are neither pro-Pakistan nor are they a proxy of Pakistan. They are fair-weather friends desperately in need of Pakistan's support for their diplomatic outreach to regional states and other major powers.
- They hold an anti-Pakistan sentiment that is equally found in other Afghan nationals. Some media reports even draw our attention to the fact that many Taliban officials are fed up with the dictation coming from Pakistan.
- Unification has happened in the recent past as the TTP have re-connected with their support base within Pakistan which is the sectarian element in Baluchistan specifically in Mastung and Quetta. This trend will continue in the future.
- Another factor is the ongoing military operations in important regions against the TTP which are provoking terrorist attacks. The assessment behind these actions is unknown.
- Maybe our security forces are thinking they would continue creating a challenge for the TTP leadership, targeting it, launching operations against their fighters which would provoke them and they would gradually spoil their resources.
- Military operations and terrorist attacks are going side by side. We cannot say how much effective these contributions are but they are going to be a part of our long-term strategy.
- Since we rely on open sources for our information, the dynamics of the Taliban show that TTP and the Afghan Taliban are not different.
- *Shariat Risala* of the Afghan Taliban has never renounced TTP as a separate entity.
- There are credible pieces of evidence that the Afghan Taliban had sent a code of conduct to the TTP last year, to halt the terrorist attacks as the Afghan Taliban was involved in negotiations.
- A committee was made from among the members of the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, and the former had said to not interfere in the objectives of the TTP and named it as their brother organization.
- We cannot term them as separate entities.
- The current setup in Afghanistan should be termed as Taliban regime as long as Pakistan does not officially recognize it.
- Within Pakistan, among media and public opinion, there is a widespread oversimplification of the issues which is dangerous, it undermines the accurate interpretation of threat perception of Pakistan.
- We must factually analyze the situation and not consider them as black and white as they seem. All the neighboring countries do the same as that is how the world works.
- Pakistan's security stabilization is more important than the Taliban regime.

**Lt. Gen Asif Yasin Malik****Former Defence Secretary of Pakistan**

- The concept of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Afghanistan emerged particularly after 9/11. This was the same group that fought against the Soviets as Afghan Mujahideen. They became a force after the US invasion. Many people say that this concept comes from Pakistani madaris, I tend to partially disagree. Madaris are present on both sides of the Pakistan and Afghanistan border of the Pashtun belt, so blaming Pakistan for it is unfair.
- There was a group of people led by Mullah Fazlullah and his team, and some were fighting in South Waziristan, who sought the same concept of establishing Sharia in Pakistan. First in erstwhile FATA, then in Swat, and then in other parts. This is how the first conceptual base of TTP was laid down on the concept of the Afghan Taliban.
- They started doing it 2003-4 and onwards. There were a lot of activities by Pakistan security forces, like many agreements and small-scale operations. Before 2008, no major, sizeable operation took place in erstwhile FATA and other parts against TTP. Till then there were mixed responses of talking and fighting. We suffered from this strategy. It helped TTP spread its wings to Swat, Buner, and Shangla areas. It was a strategic move because the people of Swat were innocent and unarmed.
- TTP's attempts at threatening Chinese interests are not new. They had this dimension in mind like they would go to Shangla and Buner and threaten Karakoram Highway's routes from China to Pakistan. Although there was no CPEC at that time.
- When the Pakistan military started negotiations with Mullah Fazlullah and his team, they started killing the informers who they suspected and started burning the women's schools. It was a great fillip to the TTP movement. It was the time when international media started giving rumors about the presence of the group to Islamabad by only 60 miles. It was hair-raising as the world was talking about it. As a consequence of that, the stance of dialogue was given up. So the first operation took place by late 2008, and by 2011, we had sizeable forces of around 60,000 in that area. Along with this, there were schemes about winning the hearts and minds of the people, due to which many development and de-radicalization projects were also started.
- In 2014, the APS attack was a turning point. Before APS, there was a sequential response. But the attack ended the sequential response as the entire country unanimously started talking against the TTP narrative.
- Due to the porous Pakistan-Afghanistan border, TTP members crossed into Afghanistan where they found refuge, funding and medical assistance. It was a welcoming environment for them as it brought them in contact with India's Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS), and other Western intelligence agencies.
- Border fencing was also a turning point. We have so far fenced 90% of the border. But all the border does not require fencing as some areas are as high as 14,000-15,000 feet. So, it makes crossings very hard for both sides. But it will be fenced at the end of the day.

- The amalgamation of FATA with KP was also a setback for TTP. Earlier there were talks about enforcement of Sharia in Pakistani parts, but now extremists have evolved into a kind of global footprint, like if we talk about an 'Islamic Emirate'.
- The recent Tehrik-i-Taliban Afghanistan takeover, first of all, is not only a psychological boost for TTP, but the larger landscape for right wing people in Pakistan, and I would say not only in Pakistan but in other parts of the world, as well.
- August 15 should not be taken as a surprise as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Afghanistan was already holding more than 60% of territory before it. It was only after the accord that they started moving forward silently. It was a boost for TTP.
- As far as the activities of the last 6 months are concerned, in my opinion, this was a surge of TTP along with other groups operating in Afghanistan to show their resolve and to influence the decision-making of the people who are fence-sitters.
- The US defeat is not a fall of an empire but is the defeat of an ideology that was foisted on the people of Afghanistan.
- Those who could not force their policies will try to show that the Taliban are incapable to run the country and that could happen with instability within Pakistan. The Taliban are in the country for only a month and the country is facing famine and other crises. I ask what western countries had been doing for twenty years. Certainly, the crises are not created by the Taliban government.
- The West would like to destabilize Afghanistan so a lasting integration between Russia, Iran, China, and Pakistan does not take place in a peaceful environment. This all suits TTP also as a lingering instability in Afghanistan is good news for TTP.
- One of the most likable happenings in the coming weeks will be the support extended to TTP by sleeping cells in Afghanistan. So, instability falls into Pakistan. If both Afghanistan and Pakistan are unstable, it will be hunky-dory for the Western world. Iran will likely suffer from the instability in Afghanistan.
- We should leave the issue of TTP to be solved by the Afghan government. The statements on Afghanistan by every Pakistani ministers and politicians should be stopped. It irritates the Afghan government. In backchannel talks, we should emphasize the Afghan government to tackle TTP.
- We have to put in place stringent border control mechanisms because the security forces in Afghanistan are almost evaporated and now a new team of people is sitting on the border posts, which have to be brought into the crossing mechanism.
- We have to review the overall environment in the border regions like erstwhile FATA. The districts of that area must deny a favourable environment for the operations of TTP.
- There are two aspects; one is the physical aspect of carrying out the operation and the other is the socio-economic aspect. The earlier we start socio-economic projects in these districts the more people will get involved in the economic activities, the better.

- We have to enhance the interaction with the tribal leaders of that area in a meaningful way. We must not forget that despite merging FATA into the settled area, the tribal Pakhtun culture is still surviving today so we have to immediately go close to the tribal leadership.
- The most important step that has to be taken is an announcement of local body elections in KPK and the bordering districts. It is a major activity that would keep the people away from TTP's agenda as there would be a political activity involving parties, their members, media, and talks on the local affairs.
- The local body structure would ensure tribal leaders have a piece in the pie that would render value to the people through union councils.
- We have to carry out serious intelligence-based operations and tackle the survivors of the erstwhile TTP who are now coming out to join it.
- Pakistan has to seriously enhance the speed of the regional engagement and formally connect to negotiate the recognition of new Afghan government which would ensure stability.
- The confidence in the regime in Afghanistan and recognition of the government among a groups of sovereign nations will render them to be in a better position to take a hardened stance against TTP.
- All these countries have their own concerns and agendas from China to Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan et cetera, can be a part of collective negotiations towards recognition.
- Last but not least is to stabilize our own socio-economic landscape. Turbulence and inequality are the breeding ground for organizations like TTP until the vacuum is not filled and the population is not satisfied.

**Lt. Naeem Khalid Lodhi**

**Former Defence Secretary of Pakistan**

- The nexus being created between the Afghan Taliban and TTP is false, even though they might have had connections in the past, their objectives were completely different.
- The Afghan Taliban was fighting for their freedom throughout and did not pay much attention to the activities of the TTP.
- The TTP was being funded by CIA, RAW, NDS, and other foreign intelligence agencies against Pakistan, so TTP and Afghan Taliban are not the same.
- The Afghan Taliban has made promises to not only Pakistan but other regional actors to curtail the terrorist organizations as well, so the dangers of terrorism are being exaggerated.
- The training, funding and goals of both TTP and Afghan Taliban were not the same.
- The real danger is of the spillover philosophy; that if the Afghan Taliban can implement swift justice and efforts for the protection of people, what impact that would have on our democracy that has not been able to do it.
- We need to focus on the stabilization of our socio-economic fabric.
- The Afghan Taliban would not harbour any elements to carry out activities in Pakistan.
- The reorganization of TTP with other terrorist elements has been done by Raw and CIA which increased their potency.
- The Threat perception is being created for Pakistan by creating a connection between TTP and the Afghan Taliban.

**IPI Findings:**

1. The character of militancy in the region is likely to experience a gradual change. The arrival of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan portends a potential resurgence of TTP and a rebirth of the banned sectarian and right-wing organisations in Pakistan.
2. The new chapter in the resurgence of TTP is more lethal as its senior commanders live cheek by jowl with the Afghan Taliban. TTP has lately diversified its connections with other sectarian, ethnic and regional terror outfits. A recent uptick in the TTP's anti-Pakistan attacks is a testimony to the revival of the terror group on the geopolitical landscape of Pakistan.
3. The TTP will try to exploit the prevailing grievances against the state, like extrajudicial killings and forced displacements due to the state-backed military operations.
4. It is uncertain if the Afghan Taliban will use their influence to rein in the TTP's activities against Pakistan. Even if they try to exert political pressure out of their sheer necessity to depend on Pakistan as their diplomatic survival, there is a threat that TTP will split up into splinter groups. These groups can continue to attack Pakistan by forging cooperation with IS-K and other anti-Pakistan groups, like BLA.
5. The Afghan Taliban's declaration to announce that TTP is solely Pakistan's issue has generated new doubts about the willingness of the group to cooperate with Islamabad. The neutral attitude of the Afghan Taliban will provide a permissive environment for TTP factions to launch a new war against Pakistan.
6. TTP has transformed its political direction and now it wishes to establish a limited Islamic Emirate in the tribal belt on the model of Afghanistan's Islamic Emirate. For this ambition to be fulfilled, the Afghan Taliban are likely to share a helping hand with TTP.
7. The government should work on reevaluating the operation capabilities of these groups. There is a need to find out the sources of their narrative, so the threat is tackled accordingly. The kinetic operations by the armed forces of Pakistan had largely dismantled the group but the late revival is an indication that only kinetic measures are not enough.
8. The Afghan Taliban might not curtail links with the different terror outfits, particularly to use them as a bargaining tool to engage with other states diplomatically.
9. One of the threats could be related to a spillover philosophy. If the Afghan Taliban manage to establish just governance in the country, it might provide incentives to people in Pakistan to get influenced by their system and take arms.
10. The government can discourage the youth from attracting to the TTP agenda by improving the socio-economic landscape and holding local bodies elections in the region.